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ABSTRACT

Conditions of Personhood and Property
by
Zachary James Acree

Advisor: Dr. Miryam Segal

This paper seeks to demonstrate that a more robust understanding of personhood both
reveals flaws in the underlying assumptions of modern property law, and orients that law to a more
just application. To do this, the law needs not only a better definition of what persons are, but also
a better understanding of how persons function in their society. First, in order to provide some
context to the issues at stake, there is a brief historical introduction to some of the problems that
personhood inquiries have faced. After the introduction, this paper is divided into four
sections. Part I summarizes Daniel Dennett’s six necessary conditions for personhood, and posits
these conditions as preferable to the currently accepted, and rather vague, legal definition. Part II
critically examines three historically significant views of personhood: the Psychological View, the
Biological View and the Anthropological View. This examination is done in terms of Dennett’s
necessary conditions, in order to show that a person should be conceived of as a “who” rather than
a “what”. The difference between these two conceptions must be made explicit in order to show
the necessity of a seventh condition, that a person have a life narrative. Part III explains how this
life narrative functions in society, providing a framework to understand the interaction between
persons and institutions such as the law. Lastly, Part IV examines Lockean conceptions that have
shaped our legal treatment of property, and whether or not that treatment accommodates persons as
they have been defined and understood in the previous sections of this paper. To conclude, this
paper makes recommendations for future treatments of property issues that would better respect the
structure and functions of personhoods.
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INTRODUCTION
Identity has posed challenges to philosophers since at least Aristotle’s time.1 These
challenges have been diverse, and each with its own history of interlocutors. For the purposes of
this paper, it is helpful to introduce three types of identity that have been recognized by
philosophers over the course of the identity debate. They are Substantial, Specific, and Temporal
identity. Substantial identity refers to the numerical uniqueness of an object. For example, there is
only one planet Earth, and it doesn’t matter that it has different names in different languages, for all
those names pick out the same unique object. Specific identity refers to an object being classified
as the same kind of object or entity as others. For instance, Earth is a planet among other planets,
which are classified according to common properties. Temporal identity refers to an object
maintaining permanence despite apparent changes over time. Therefore the Earth has existed for
billions of years, despite having different features at one time or another.
While all three types of identity have their peculiarities and controversies, it is the third,
temporal, which seems to have been the most preferred when discussing what it means to have
personal identity. It is not difficult to see why this kind of identity has grabbed the attention of
philosophers, dating at the very least back to John Locke.2 Although cells in our bodies die and are
replaced such that we are not physically the same from moment to moment, it seems an obvious
fact that personal identity is yet maintained across time. Few would ever say that when they wake
up tomorrow, it is someone else that will be waking. Therefore, personhood involves being
conscious of one’s permanence across time. That is to say, a person has a memory of past events
that ground an understanding of the present self, and can project that present self into the future.

1
2

See Barnes, who discusses Aristotle wrestling with the identity of indiscernibles
See Chapter XXVII in Essay Concerning Human Understanding
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Interestingly, it is also clear that personhood is transient. A personhood is never entirely formed.
Its structures change with each new memory added, with each new experience had. Yet how do
these two seemingly contradictory characteristics, permanence and transience, simultaneously
construct a person’s identity?
This conundrum led Hume to contend that there really is no such thing as personhood itself.
In Book 1 of his A Treatise On Human Nature, he points out that what one would normally call the
self is really just an endless series of perceptions that are replaced in rapid succession. He writes:
“I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe
anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by
sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist”
(Hume 187)
When a person refers to themselves as a “person”, then, they are just referring to the impressions
they are receiving at any given moment, and, as Hume believed, this means that it would be
impossible to both be a person and perceive nothing.
Hume’s point is well taken, but he may have been wrong in two ways. First, on Hume’s
stance, human beings appear as passive creatures, simply reacting to whatever flood of stimuli
happens to be passing over them. Yet whether something is considered a person or not is not
judged on the grounds of whether it feels heat, sees a tree, or smells a pot cooking on the stove.
These are just indicative that the thing in question is alive, not that it has a personhood. Hume
seems to have equated the two terms, thus nullifying the need to have a term like “personhood”
altogether. Yet the two terms, being alive and being a person, are different, and necessarily so.
Tomato plants and bacteria react to stimuli as well, but are never endowed with certain
characteristics that are only reserved for persons. For example, no one would ever make the claim
2

that a jellyfish “owned” something, or that a tomato plant was “guilty” of doing something wrong.
Ownership and guilt are characteristics that are only ascribed to persons, thus differentiating them
from other living things that merely perceive and react to stimuli. Secondly, and more
fundamentally, Hume failed to address a philosophical issue at stake with identity: Theseus's
paradox.3 It is not just with the identity of persons that temporality creates problems, it is also with
inanimate objects. This paradox asks the question of whether Theseus’ ship was still the same
object after each and every piece of it was replaced. There are other variations of the story, such as
John Locke’s favorite sock, Abraham Lincoln’s axe, and Jeannot’s knife, but the central issue
remains the same: how can something have the same identity if all of its parts change over time?
In order to have a unique identity at all, any object, such as Theseus ship, it seems that it
must have both qualitative and numerical identity.4 Qualitative identity refers to the ownership of
shared properties. So two planets, Earth and Venus, can be qualitatively identical in that they both
share the common properties of having atmospheres, orbiting the sun, and having rocky surfaces.
In order to pin down individuality, there must also be numerical identity. This kind of identity
requires total qualitative identity, and can only exist between an object and itself. There are
certainly controversies over what it means to have these kinds of identity at one time, but for the
purposes of this paper, it is really the controversy of diachronic identity that is directly related to
identity as it applies to persons. The main issue for diachronic identity is how something can
continue to exist over time, all the while experiencing changes in its qualitative properties. For
example, what if, when remodeling Theseus’ ship, all the sails were changed from white burlap to
yellow canvas? Would that change in qualitative characteristics justify saying that it was not the

See Harry Deutsch’s explanation of this paradox for greater detail
See Harold Noonan and Ben Curtis’s summary of qualitative and numerical identity in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
3
4
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same ship? What if the sails were completely removed and a motor were installed?
To get around this issue entirely, another solution was proposed by Aristotle.5 That
solution is that the real identity of the ship comes not from any material that it was made with, but
rather the purpose, or final cause, of the ship itself. So, if the original ship was designed to carry
Theseus, and so was the remodeled version, then the identity persists despite any and all qualitative
changes in material parts.
Yet how this applies to persons is not entirely clear. For while it makes perfect sense to
speak of the “final cause” of a ship, or any tool made and named by man, it does not seem to make
obvious sense to speak of a person’s “final cause”. For this demands an answer to the question:
What were persons designed to do? Because persons did not design themselves, the answer to this
question is not available to us in the same way it is when asking what a ship or a credit card is
designed to do. It is arguable whether the question even makes sense when applied to anything
biological, for the answer always seems to be the same: adapt and survive under changing
conditions, which lacks any real potency to the identity questions as it applies to the personhood of
human beings.
The real test of personhood then, must be of another nature entirely. Rather than a sensoryreactive test, or an intended-design test, it must consist of different criteria. Both Hume’s
qualification for personal identity and Aristotle’s seem to have assumed that persons are just like
any other physical objects in the world. But much is lacking in their accounts of personal identity.
In some sense, they are right. Persons do have physicality, and therefore we can ask questions
stemming from general identity theory. But in many ways, persons are not like rocks or frogs or
credit cards. The personal identity question, “who are you?”, could not properly be asked of rocks,
5
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frogs, or credit cards, only the categorical question, “what are you?”. Therefore, it seems as if
persons, as “whos” rather than “whats”, have characteristics that separate them from other physical
objects, and that these characteristics demand special treatment regarding identity questions. So
what are these characteristics? It is now that we turn to Daniel Dennett, and his six conditions of
personhood.

Part I: Conditions of Personhood
In the law, a person can be categorized as either natural or juridical. A natural person “... is
an individual being capable of assuming obligations and capable of holding rights”, while a
juridical person is an entity “...endowed with juridical personality who are usually known as a
collective person, social person, or legal entity” (Elvia p. 366). All other things are therefore nonpersons, and do not have rights. One may accept this as a given, for it seems that the difference
between a person and a non-person is painfully obvious. No one would doubt that the human being
walking down the street, or the individual who wrote this essay were indeed persons, and therefore
deserving of special rights. Likewise, one would be considered completely mad if she pointed to a
rock and baptized it as a person, and due the same unique treatment as herself. It seems as if the
law is designating persons as special, but does not explain how, perhaps because it is assuming that
the difference between a person and a non-person is obvious and not worth pointing out. Yet this
kind of differentiation between persons and non-persons is vague at best. It does not spell out any
testable conditions by which something is judged a person or non-person, except perhaps that
another person recognize it as such. This ambiguous condition, as the only one implied by the law,
does nothing to inform us about the true characteristics of personhood, or the fair and just treatment
of persons according to what those characteristics are.
5

Because “person” is found so commonly in law, “One might well hope that such an
important concept, applied and denied so confidently, would have clearly formulatabic necessary
and sufficient conditions for ascription, but if it does, we have not yet discovered them” (Dennett p.
175). Interestingly, despite the lack of a clear-cut definition, the law has divided personhood into
two separate categories, those being a legal person (which does not necessarily have to be a human
being) and a natural person (which does have to be a human being). Of course, this distinction is
arbitrary, and only came about due to the financial conveniences of corporations, not due to the
study of philosophers. In this description, there are only two conditions to meet the kind of
personhood that is of concern here: one must be human and a non-corporation. Hardly any
consolation for worries about personhood.
But what do philosophers have to say about personhood? Several philosophers have made
attempts to outline necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood. One of the most widely
known is Daniel Dennett, who outlined six necessary conditions by which personhood is
established. Though the specifics of each condition are the subject of debate, having these spelled
out explicitly is far better than the current legal definition. Understanding more precisely what a
person is will allow a more just assessment of whether the law respects persons or does violence to
them. These are Dennett’s six conditions, listed in the order of dependence6, according to
Dennett:7
1. A person must be a rational being
2. A person must be a being to which psychological predicates can be ascribed
3. A person must have others treat her/him in a person-like way

6

As Dennett explains, the first three are mutually dependent on one another. Condition 4 is dependent on the
combination of 1, 2, and 3. Condition 5 is dependent on condition 4, and condition 6 is dependent on 5.
7
These are a summarized version of Dennett’s wording. See Dennet’s article, pages 177 -179, for a more thorough
explanation of each.
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4. A person can reciprocate that same person-like treatment back onto others
5. A person is capable of verbal communication
6. A person is distinguishable from other entities by being conscious in a special way
Dennett’s six attributes inspire more questions about the nature of personhood than they
accurately define it. For example, the first one, upon which, by Dennett’s own admission all the
others depend, requires that we have fully fleshed out what it means to be rational. This alone is a
tricky issue, around which has swirled much debate. That being said, what it really means to be
rational is not the subject of this paper. It suffices to say that it would be far harder to dismiss
rationality as a condition of personhood, than it would be to prove otherwise. The second condition
really concerns the psychology of the object in question, specifically whether or not the object has
intentions. Examples of this include a person X fearing that Y, or a person X hoping that Z. This
condition is likewise not too difficult to swallow, as one would be hard pressed to come up with an
example in which a person could exist without having any intentional states. The third condition,
however, is where Dennett’s system gets interesting. He describes it as such:
The third theme is that whether something counts as a person depends in some way
on an attitude taken toward it, a stance adopted with respect to it. This theme
suggests that it is not the case that once we have established the objective fact that
something is a person we treat him or her or it a certain way, but that our treating
him or her or it in this certain way is somehow and to some extent constitutive of its
being a person. (Dennett p. 177)
Thus, according to Dennett, the existence of a personhood largely depends on the existence of
other beings who believe that the thing in question is a person, and treat it as such. More will be
said about what that treatment looks like later on.
Now, as Dennett states, the first three conditions are all interdependent upon one another,
7

and as such are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a personhood to emerge. This is because
all three make up a class of things which Dennett calls “Intentional Systems”, of which persons are
members. Thus, in order to really understand these conditions, an exploration of intentional
systems is needed before we unpack Dennett’s final three conditions for personhood.
According to Dennett, “An Intentional system is a system whose behavior can be (at least
sometimes) explained and predicted by relying on ascriptions to the system of beliefs and desires
(and other Intentionally characterized features...meaning to include hopes, fears, intentions,
perceptions, expectations, etc.)” of an individual (Dennett p. 179). One can see why the first three
conditions of personhood are necessary here. In order to be intentional, one must have beliefs,
which requires a rational mind. Once these two are established, the third requirement, that an
outsider take an intentional stance toward the object in question, completes the intentional system.
But why, one may ask, is the intentional stance necessary to complete the intentional system? The
answer can best be shown by examining two different explanations for the same behavior. Take,
for example, a plant growing on the forest floor. There is limited sunlight, but one particularly
strong beam makes its way through the foliage above and onto a section of the plant. Now, a
botanist may predict the behavior of the plant quite well without the need of an intentional system,
such as through purely mechanical/physicalistic explanations. The sunlight causes photosynthesis
to occur at a higher rate in the area of the plant where the light is concentrated, creating more
sugars than other parts of the plant. The increase in sugar productions causes a growth spurt to
occur in the direction of the light, thus shaping the plant towards the gap in the foliage in the tree
canopy above. This activity would happen regardless of whether or not there were an observer to
see it occur. However, such a prediction can easily be made from an intentional systems approach.
Perhaps a man comes walking through the forest. He sees the plant on the forest floor, and see the
light beam hitting only one part of the plant. His description is different. He thinks to himself:
8

“The plants wants more light, so it will grow towards the light beam. It hopes that the gap in the
tree canopy will stay open, so that it can get enough food to grow. Therefore, it will grow towards
the canopy gap.” Notice the three conditions at work. There is rationality, there are psychological
states, and there is someone to baptise the plant with the intentions. Without the third condition,
the plant would just be a machine. In this way, intentional systems are created by outside
observers, rather than existing on their own.
As Dennett himself points out, the number of things that could fall into this category is
quite large. Human beings regularly ascribe intentional states to things that are not human beings,
such as animals and plants, as their behavior can, in many ways, be predicted in terms of what they
“believe” or “intend” to do in certain situations. For example, squirrels may collect and hide nuts
because they “believe” that winter is coming, and they “expect” for there not to be much food lying
around in a month or two. Their “fear” is what drives them to store the nuts, in the “hope” that
they will supply themselves with food in the coming cold. Though there are other explanations of
such behavior, such as mechanistic, physicalistic ones, one cannot deny that intentionalistic
explanations are often just as useful, and certainly more common among human beings. Dennett
provides another example of intentional states being ascribed to plants, namely by loggers with
whom he spoke in Maine.
These men invariably call a tree not "it" but "he," and will say of a young spruce "he
wants to spread his limbs, but don't let him; then he'll have to stretch up to get his
light" or "pines don't like to get their feet wet the way cedars do." Additionally,
“You can "trick" an apple tree into ‘thinking it's spring’ by building a small fire
under its branches in the late fall; it will blossom... (Dennett p. 180)
It may give one pause to consider that so many things could be described as “intentional” in
the same way that human beings are. One could possibly explain this fear away by stating that
9

human beings are simply on a higher level, or rather a second-order intentional system, and thus
above the plants and animals. One may say that it is only persons who act based on their
perceptions of beliefs and other psychological predicates in other things, which is Dennett’s fourth
condition of reciprocity. For instance, one may feel the need to help a hapless tourist navigate the
subway map, based on the perception that the tourist doesn’t have correct beliefs about where she
is. While this may filter out simpler forms of life such as plants, it does not do so well with many
clever animal species, who have been known to “trick” predators, i.e induce a false belief in them.
Dennett’s example of this is that of a bird who feigns a broken wing whenever a predator nears her
nest. The bird deceives the predator into thinking it is easy prey, luring it away from the nest, and
thus saving its offspring. It acts based on its perception of a belief in the predator, which it
harnesses for a useful end (saving its children). Therefore, it seems that there are some creatures
that share a person’s ability to possess second-order intentions.
Despite one’s feelings about sharing personhood conditions with some clever animals, it is
important to remember that there are two more conditions necessary to constitute a person,
according to Dennett. The next criterion, verbal communication, is necessary to differentiate what
we would normally consider persons from that which we consider non-persons, such as birds, dogs,
and other clever animals. When Dennett speaks of verbal communication, he does so through the
lens of Grice’s theory of meaning, in which meaning is cashed out in terms of intentions of the
speaker. Dennett’s summary of Grice’s explanation of meaning is as follows:
U meant something by uttering x" is true if, for some audience A, U
uttered x intending
(1) A to produce a particular response r,
and/or
(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1)
10

and/or
(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of his fulfillment of (2)
(Dennett p. 186)
As Dennett points out, what is important here is that for reciprocity to take place via
communication, a third-order intention must be possible. When a speaker U says something to
another intentional system, “U must intend that A recognize that U intends that A produce r”
(Dennett p. 186). This is where the complexity of human beings exceeds that of other known
animals. Therefore, when Dennett postulates his fifth condition, that there be verbal
communication, he is speaking of this kind of Gricean third-order communication, and not
nonverbal communication in general, such as a bird’s mating call.
Finally, we arrive at Dennett’s sixth condition for personhood, that the object in question
have a “special” kind of consciousness. According to Dennett, this special awareness is really of a
reflexive nature, ultimately meaning that a person must be able to take the same person-like stance
toward herself that she takes towards others. In order to understand what kind of reflexivity
Dennett is talking about here, two keys issues must be explored. The first is John Rawls’ theory of
justice, and the second is Harry G. Frankfurt’s concept of second-order volitions.
As Rawls’ theory of justice is far too broad a topic to fully explore in this paper, only an
explanation of how it relates to Dennett’s notion of special consciousness is needed here. Dennett
is primarily concerned with Rawls’ idea of an “original position”, that is, a stance taken by
interlocutors that there is an idealized situation which ideal persons occupy. As Rawls’ explains,
however, the original position “...is not, of course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs,
much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation
characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice” (Rawls 208). Thus, when person are
communicating, they are communicating as if one another understands and is trying to abide by an
11

unspoken system of justice. This system then guides their interactions, as they build meaning with
respect to one another, in an attempt to approximate this original position. Thus, in order to have
justice, there must be communication between persons.
Now the stances taken by actors are purely normative in nature, as each actor engages with
one another under the assumption that they too ought to be acting as if in that ideal original
position, in order to avoid the “nasty, brutish, and short” lives that Hobbes postulated.

Although

there certainly are many theories of justice, and myriad laws deriving from them, the conception of
justice Rawls discusses here is not of an explicit, consciously deliberated nature. Though
deliberate and careful thinking can result in the creation of more just practices, people do not
actively refer to these in their day-to-day interactions with other persons. Thus, as Dennett says,
“we can see that there is ‘an order which is there’ in a just society that is independent of any actual
episodes of conscious thought” (Dennett p. 190).
Within these personal interactions, persons must make accommodations for one another
through the process of negotiation. Negotiating requires active, rational minds that are capable of
navigating reasons and the trains of thought that lead to them. This characteristic of persuasion
within the original position allows access to what Dennett claims is an essential part of
consciousness, and a necessary condition for personhood, second-order volitions. First-order
volitions are desires to do one particular action, or to not do one particular action. Unlike any other
animal, which are only capable of first-order volitions, persons “...may also want to have (or not to
have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences
and purposes, from what they are” (Frankfurt p. 7). For example, though a person may desire to be
wealthy, she may simultaneously have the desire to not desire wealth. Thus, the volition here is not
to do one particular thing, but rather to have a different motive, such that an entirely different set of
actions may result. According to Frankfurt, freedom of the will is not a given, but rather only
12

comes about when one’s second order volitions are satisfied by becoming actual.
So why does this notion of second-order volition become necessary for Dennett’s special
consciousness? “Because”, Dennett explains, “...the ‘reflexive self-evaluation’ Frankfurt speaks of
is, and must be, genuine self-consciousness, which is achieved only by adopting toward oneself the
stance not simply of communicator but of...reason-asker and persuader” (Dennett p. 193). A
person’s special consciousness is derived from their ability to direct their consciousness inward, in
that they are capable of both communicating with themselves and understanding themselves as a
person. In this way, persons are not only constructed by others, but also by themselves. In order
for someone to have the wherewithal needed to be aware of their first-order volitions, evaluate
them, and then decide if they are worthwhile, their consciousness must have the peculiar ability to
be turned inward, reflexively. As no other thing in existence seems to have this capability, it truly
is what makes a person’s consciousness “special”.
Of special interest for the purposes of this paper is that of the six conditions discussed, half
of them have a social element to them. While it is possible to imagine a rational being with
psychological predicates, using second-order volitions in total isolation from all other beings
(conditions one, two, and six), it is not possible for that isolated being to have another being,
outside of itself, take a person-stance towards it (condition three) while in total isolation. Without
condition three being met, there can be no reciprocity (condition four), and in total isolation, there
would also be no verbal communication (condition five), as Grice explains it. Therefore, the
Descartian person, who thinks therefore he is, is only half formed on Dennett’s explanation. In
order to be whole, it seems that the existence of one person presupposes and demands that there be
other persons.
Despite the robustness with which Dennett presents his conditions, he ultimately expresses
doubt that they are comprehensive and final. This conclusion is largely based in his acceptance of
13

Rawls’ original position, in which human beings are forever stuck in approximating ideal persons
between one another. “...the concept of a person is, I have tried to show, inescapably normative.
Human beings or other entities can only aspire to being approximations of the ideal, and there can
be no way to set a ‘passing grade’ that is not arbitrary” (Dennett p. 193). Hence, while the
conditions listed above may be taken as necessary, one can never say that they are sufficient, for
other conditions of personhood likely exist.
Dennett’s six conditions are hard to argue away, as they seem to accurately describe a
person, but is it possible that he has missed anything essential? Categorically speaking, he has.
This is the case because his conditions do not quite answer the question of who a person is, only
rather the question of what a person is. In order to answer the personal identity question “who”, an
addition to his six conditions is needed.
Why is this relevant? As the purpose of this paper is to explore how a more robust
understanding of persons can illuminate the justice of laws, we must consider whether Dennett’s
six conditions are useful to this end. When considering crimes against a person, most do not
appear to violate any of Dennett’s conditions, and therefore do not seem to be an attack against any
one’s personhood. The exceptions are of extreme violence, such as murder, or severe mental
impairment. However, of the more common crimes against persons, Dennett’s conditions do not
seem to be violated. If someone steals your wallet, have they rendered you unable to be an
intentional system? Have they taken away your ability to be reciprocal, have meaningful
communication, or have second order volitions? What if they rendered you blind? Prohibited you
from voting? The answer is no. You would still be a functioning intentional system capable of
reciprocity and fully capable of having second order volitions. And yet, no one would be willing to
deny that a crime against you had happened.

14

It is possible that there are crimes that do not violate personhoods. But there are also
crimes that do seem to violate personhoods, and yet do not disrespect Dennett’s conditions. In
some of these cases, there is an inescapable element of property involved. Persons, and only
persons, have ownerships over their wallets just as they do over their bodies, though there are
nuances of difference. So in what way are personhoods tied to their property? Dennett’s
conditions do nothing in the way of explaining which way that is. In order to do that, there must be
at least one other condition of personhood that has yet to be identified, one that can account for
violations of the personal dimension of property.
Some of Dennett’s conditions are individually oriented, such as that a person be rational,
that a person have psychological predicates, and that a person have second-order volitions.
Dennett also had elements of sociality built into his conditions. His third condition, that one be
treated as a person, his fourth, that one reciprocate that treatment, and his fifth, that one participate
in Gricean communication with other intentional beings, all have inescapable social dimensions to
them. At the very least, these indicate that to be a person, in many ways, means to be both an
individual and to be a person in tandem with other persons. What Dennett is missing, however, is
what purpose these activities, both individual and social, have. While it makes sense that a person
necessarily meets these six conditions, Dennett does not explain any overarching context that
would bind the six together in meaningful purposefulness. Without that binding purposeful
context, it wouldn’t matter what second-order volition were chosen, or what was uttered to who, or
what it really meant. These expressions would spill out into a void. Yet purpose is invariably tied
to persons and their actions. The absence of purpose, in fact, is understood as meaninglessness.
So, if we are to add purpose to Dennett’s conditions, how are we to describe it? As we will see,
that purpose is the act of world-building, and most crimes against persons are not against their
Dennett’s six conditions, but against their purpose as individual and social world-creators.
15

Part II: The Seventh Condition
I.

The Psychological View
While having these six necessary conditions for personhood may allow one to better flesh

out a definition of a person, it does not solve certain problems that have worried thinkers for quite
some time. Although the study of personhood arguably started long before him, with Plato’s
notion of an immaterial soul, Locke is really the first to worry about the nature of personal identity
as it concerned ethics and its applications. To Locke, a person is "a thinking intelligent being, that
has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different
times and places” (Locke, p. 115). Thus, like Dennett, Locke believed that rationality played an
integral part in determining the nature of personhood. In addition to this condition of rationality,
Locke believed that a person must be able to recognize herself as such not only in the present
moment, but also as the same person in the past and into the future. The connection between
present and past or future selves has been called the personal identity relation,8 and concerns
ownership of past memories and experiences. So, if a person W remembers an experience X had
by person Y, then person W is the same person as Y. This understanding of personhood was built
in order to unify slices of time in a person’s life such that moral responsibility could confidently be
assigned, as per our more practical needs for understanding personhood. For, without some kind of
account of a person across time, if a person committed a crime ten years ago, she could not
justifiably be punished should she be found guilty.
As time progressed, this study of how temporal self-recognition works would become the
foundation for the Psychological View of personhood, perhaps culminating with Parfit’s

8

See David Shoemaker for an explanation of the personal identity relation in more detail
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Psychological Criterion, largely an extension of Locke’s personal identity relation. Parfit defines it
as five main points:
(1) There is psychological continuity if and only if there are overlapping chains of
strong connectedness. X today is one and the same person as Y at some past time if
and only if (2) X is psychologically continuous with Y, (3) this continuity has the
right kind of cause, and (4) it has not taken a 'branching' form. (5) Personal identity
over time just consists in the holding of facts like (2) to (4)
(Parfit p. 207)
The “connectedness” that Parfit speaks of in his definition is what he calls “the holding of
particular direct psychological connections” between person A at time C and person B at time D.
These connections could be memories, intentions, beliefs, or other psychological phenomena.
What matters here is that the Psychological View, as exemplified by Parfit, deals with at least some
of our practical concerns about personhood quite well. For example, on this view, one is only
responsible for past actions if their current psychology is strongly connected to that of a past
psychology.
Though this view seems to deal with practical worries about responsibility and blame, it
does not incorporate Dennett’s necessary conditions very well. On the Psychological View, only
the first two conditions are truly required, that one be rational and have psychological predicates.
The Psychological View, by its nature, is not concerned with the subjectivity of either the
individual being observed or the observer. Rather, it tries it to rule subjectivity out entirely. Thus,
there is no requirement that the observer treat the object of interest in any special, person-like way.
Rather, the opposite is preferred, as the person-candidate needs to be observed as objectively as
possible. The observer’s job is merely to determine the strength of memory connection between
slices of time-selves, like a zoologist comparing the genes of two animals to see if they are the
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same species. Therefore, without the requirement of a person-like stance being taken towards the
person-candidate it’s not even necessary for a person to be a fully formed intentional system.
Condition four would also be unnecessary, for one cannot reciprocate a person-like stance if there
were not stance taken in the first place. Likewise, conditions five and six are also not necessary
conditions on the Psychological View. If all that matters is strength of connectedness across time,
what would it matter if the person-candidate could verbally communicate those experiences, or be
able to have second-order volitions?
Given that the Psychological View does handle our practical worries about credit, blame,
responsibility, and other moral issues, one might be forgiven for overlooking its unresolved
inconsistencies with abstract necessary conditions. Indeed, stemming from a Lockean tradition,
many philosophers have done so. However, there is yet another issue which plagues advocates of
this view. While the Psychological View does tie together different slices of time-selves in a
satisfying way, it is not able to withstand worries about the essence of personhood. Worries about
essence may stem from seemingly arbitrary characteristics that one holds as essential to who they
are as a person. For example, perhaps at one time in the past I strongly identify myself according
to a number of properties, such as an American, a Democrat, and a teacher. Though I viewed these
properties as central to my identity, I could lose them later in life, or perhaps retain them, and yet
diminish their importance in the construction of my self-concept. Therefore, it seems as if these
properties, so easily interchangeable, are in fact orbiting around something else, the essence of
personhood. But what is this essence? The Psychological View seems to say that this essence is
psychological continuity, as it is what perpetuates my self across time. But many philosophers
have pointed out several instances where this understanding seems to fail.
One of these instances is known as the circularity objection. The logic of this objection is
based on how we distinguish between apparent memories and true ones. According to the
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Psychological View, memories and other psychological phenomenon are the criteria of personal
identity. We are what our strong, connected memories make us out to be, over time. Yet not all
memories are genuine. A crazy person may believe, for example, that he is actually Abraham
Lincoln, or that he was abducted by aliens when he was three years old. Now, the way that one
would determine which memories are true and which are merely apparent is simple. As
philosopher Marya Schechtman puts it, “real memories are apparent memories in which the person
remembering is the person who actually had the experience” (Schechtman p. 74). And therein lies
the problem. The distinction between a real memory and an apparent one presupposes the notion
of a person, a notion which memory connectedness was supposed to define. Therefore, one would
need an understanding of “person” in order to establish real memory connections for a particular
person, yet would need those same real memory connections in order to understand what “person”
meant. The same objection applies to other psychological phenomena central to the Psychological
View as well, such as intention. How do people typically differentiate between a rational and an
irrational intention? One way to understand a rational intention is in terms of the abilities of the
intender. If I intend to run three miles today, that is rational because that falls within my ability. If
I intend to sleep on Mars, that is not. Additionally, if I intend for another to act in a certain way,
that is likewise irrational, because it is not in my power to do so. Therefore a true intention “...is
necessarily an intention that I do something, and so it seems that an action will count as the action
that carries out an intention only if the same person who forms the intention takes the action”
(Schechtman p. 74). Again, we can see that the notion of a person is presupposed. In both cases,
there is an essence, a personhood, owning these psychological phenomena. What that essence is,
the Psychological View cannot answer.

II. The Biological View
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Another instance in which the Psychological View was shown to fail the essence question
has been demonstrated by followers of the Biological View of personhood, a view meant to be
superior in handling the persistence of persons over time. Eric Olson is one such philosopher.
According to Olson, the Psychological View falls apart when the same person does not have
psychological continuity over time. One instance of the absence of psychological continuity is the
various stages of development of a human being. Olson explains that
...embryologists tell us that a human fetus that is less than about six months old
cannot remember or experience anything, and has no mental capacities worthy of
the name...you and I cannot now be related to a five-month-old fetus in any
psychological way….So if the Standard View (Psychological View) is right, nothing
could be a fetus...at one time and a person later on. No person was ever a fetus, and
no fetus ever becomes a person. (Olson p. 96)
In summary, no thing that was a non-person can suddenly become a person. Thus, as Olson
illustrates, on the Psychological View identity cannot be preserved across the fetus barrier because
psychological continuity is impossible. Yet this is counter to our practical understanding of
ourselves, for wasn’t it I who was in my mother’s womb, and I who emerged from it in foetal
form? Additionally, as I have no direct memories to recall from my infancy, on the Psychological
View it is doubtful that I as a person ever existed in such a state. This blatant inconsistency is “no
minor, technical problem but a major embarrassment” for proponents of that view (Olson p. 103).
Rather than rely on temporally connected psychological states, Olson proposes another way
to unify identity across time, one that does a much better job of capturing an essence. This is the
Biological Criterion of Personal Identity. As the name suggests, this view takes a purely
physicalistic approach to the identity question, granting identity across time “if and only if my vital
functions--those complex biochemical and mechanical activities of my atoms by virtue of which
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they compose a living organism--are preserved” (Olson p. 106). Therefore, a person only
continues to exist if he or she is the same biological organism, regardless of the connectedness of
that organism’s various psychological states.
Though this view seems to present a better account of our identity as an essence, it does not
accommodate Dennett’s conditions of personhood. For example, the Biological View is committed
to ascribing personhood to most forms of development of a human being,9 as long as the basic life
functions are operating. Thus, a fetus and a severely brain-damaged person in a persistent
vegetative state (PVS) are all just as equally persons as a full grown, perfectly functioning adult, as
their biological essence is maintained. Yet fetuses and PVS patients only have one out of the six
necessary conditions for personhood as described by Dennett, which is that others adopt a personlike stance towards them. This of course happens all the time, as expecting mothers and fathers
treat the developing fetus this way, or as loved ones of a PVS patient treat him as if he were fully
functioning. However, fetuses and PVS patients are non-rational, can’t have psychological
predicates confidently ascribed to them, cannot reciprocate a person-stance back upon those who
love them, cannot verbally communicate, and cannot have the second-order volitions necessary to
make up special consciousness. Therefore, on Dennett, it seems as though persons in this state are
not fully formed, in that they have not realized all of the six necessary conditions. But on the
Biological View, there would be no differentiating between a PVS patient and a fully functioning
cognizant adult. Equating the two goes against our intuitive understandings of rights as they are
given to persons. For example, would it make sense to say that a fetus has the right to choose its
religion (the moment it is a fetus, not as an adult later in life), or that a PVS patient has the right to
vote? Without alignment with Dennett’s conditions, these and similar questions plague the

Olson seems to believe that identity as human being starts around two weeks after conception, for cells “only adhere
loosely” before that (Olson p. 106).
9
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Biological View.
In the end, each theory is able to bear the weight of at least some of our worries about the
nature of personhood. The Psychological View deals well with our practical worries about justice
and responsibility by presenting a reasonable account of how personhood can persist over time, yet
cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the essence question. The Biological View provides a more
satisfactory answer to the essence question, and also presents an account of the persistence of
personhood over time. Yet both ultimately cannot be reconciled with Dennett’s conditions. As
those conditions are being taken as necessary, either view cannot be robust enough to form a legal
treatment of persons. For this task, another view is needed in order to make sense of personhood,
one that allows us to both make sense of the essence question and allow for Dennett’s six
conditions to hold.

III. The Anthropological View
Though the Psychological View and the Biological View have their differences, both are
primarily concerned with the problem of preserving personal identity over time, or rather, the
question of re-identification. They ask questions such as: How do I know that I, existing now, am
the same person that existed yesterday, or that will exist tomorrow? This worry has been the focus
of conversations about personal identity since Locke, and, as shown in the previous sections, has
not produced satisfying results. Perhaps this is indicative that the question of re-identification itself
is problematic for inquiries of personhood, and that another way is needed to understand the
existence of persons in time. One way to do this is to look at personal identity through the lens of
self-knowledge, rather than re-identification. For it may be the case that I am not so much
concerned with re-identification at different times, but rather true identification at any time. This is
the question of self-knowledge. For any given person, it asks “which of the beliefs, values, and
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desires that she seems to have are truly her own, expressive of who she is” (Schechtman p. 71). It
asks not the “who am I” in terms of past history and memories, but instead the “who am I” in terms
of which attributes correctly belong to a person. It posits questions of ownership, rather than
questions of persistence, which both allows for abandoning problematic notions such as time-slices
and biological continuum, and all the while incorporating Dennett’s six conditions.
The question of self-knowledge is primarily the concern of the Narrative View, or rather its
more recent name, the Anthropological View of personal identity. As proponents of this view,
such as philosopher Marya Schechtman, argue, criteria for what makes something the same thing at
different times are not really relevant for our understanding of ourselves. Rarely, they point out, is
someone concerned about whether they had the same beliefs or physical characteristics at age 10 as
they do in their present age. These kinds of similarities do not seem relevant for inquiries related to
personal identity, for the ability to draw a strong connection between a psychological state you had
years ago and one you have now seems irrelevant when trying to construct an account of who you
are. What is far more important is the proper attribution of psychological states, actions and
experiences to individuals. In other words, what makes a particular attribute mine. Intuitively
speaking, this perspective seems to be what the question “who am I?” is driving at. Though it does
happen, it is a rare case indeed when someone questions whether their past self is the same as their
current self, at least in the way the Psychological View prescribes. It seems far more common to
question attributes at any time, than to question whether the attributes are strongly connected.
On the Anthropological View, it is not the case that psychology or biology do not have any
place in the understanding of personhood. On the contrary, both are inescapably tied to our
experiences as persons. However, they are only one half of the picture. As Schechtman points out,
“...we have a dual perspective on persons. On the one hand, we view persons as one of the types of
objects in the world, but, on the other, we view them as subjects and agents, creatures with a way
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of experiencing the world and with affect and volition” (Schechtman p. 87). In this way, both the
Psychological View and the Biological View are examining persons as object-types, much like
machines or complex organisms. From this perspective, it is not unreasonable to be concerned
with temporal continuity, as this issue arises whenever studying complex objects of any type. But
this perspective is alien to the real question at hand. If I ask myself “who am I?”, I am not asking
about past history, or whether or not I really am the person that I was at some point in the past.
That kind of question is reserved for those suffering from amnesia, or other forms of memory loss.
In these extreme cases, they are unable to locate past selves, and therefore are concerned with reforming connections between their current selves and experiences in the past. Instead, I am asking
about what constitutes my true self at the current moment in time. Because the Psychological View
is by its nature an objective approach to understanding persons, and because it is “...forced to view
psychological states as atomic, isolable, and in principle independent of the subject who
experiences them”, it cannot answer this question (Schechtman p. 89).
On the other hand, viewing persons as subjective agents seems to shift the focus of the
conversation away from questions about temporal continuity, and onto ones about responsibility
and ownership. The Anthropological View doesn’t posit that psychological states are not relevant.
On the contrary, they are important, just not as time-slices that need to somehow be connected.
Instead, they are important as seen through the subjective lens of an agent, as an experiencer and
owner of them. Intuitively, this matches identity-laden questions about psychological states that
persons ask of themselves throughout their lives. For example, questions such as “What do I really
believe?” or “Why do I hope for X?” are self-reflective questions that are meant to probe one’s
own inner life. These identity questions about psychological states such as believing and hoping
have nothing to do with connecting past and present states, and everything to do with identifying
states that are true to self now.
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Therefore, while a Psychological View holder may worry about “strong connectedness”
between beliefs at different times, an Anthropological View holder will worry about whether the
beliefs are really “his”. Whether or not someone takes a belief to be genuinely theirs is a matter of
coherence, for if one belief contradicts other beliefs or experiences, it may find itself the subject of
scrutiny by the believer. This is because tension-free beliefs rarely provide a believer with reasons
to rethink them. For instance, if a person believes she is meant to be a doctor, and also experiences
joy in studying medicine, then the belief is confirmed as hers. But if she experiences confusion and
frustration when studying medicine, she may question whether her believed vocation is really hers.
In this way, persons as subjects have the ability to self-conceive, to quite literally construct
themselves, accepting some beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. as genuinely their own, while rejecting
others. This ability to construct one’s own self is highly agreeable with Dennett’s sixth condition,
that one have special consciousness through second order volitions. From this, we can derive the
“Narrative Criterion of Personal Identity: What makes an action, experience, or psychological
characteristic properly attributable to some person (and thus a proper part of his or her true self) is
its correct incorporation into the self-told story of his or her life” (Shoemaker). Intuitively, this
criterion makes more sense than the Psychological Criterion, for I’m much more likely to worry
about having a coherent self at any one time, than I am to worry about the continuity of different
time slices of myself. Furthermore, though I may have access to the past through memory and
access to the future through anticipation/prediction, I can only have direct experience of the
present. My existence as a self now will always be more important than who I was or who I will
be.
Now, one may begin to question the nature of this self-constructed story, for, so far, there
appears to be no restrictions as to what attributes a person can choose as identity-constitutive. If all
that matters is that it fit into a story that I’m telling myself about the world, it seems as if that
25

attribute could be anything. As long as my self-told story is fleshed-out enough, with enough
details and causally connected events, would it matter if I chose to believe I was a reincarnated
Genghis Khan, or that I was Luke Skywalker’s long-lost cousin? In addition, even if a self-told
narrative corresponds to reality, is it really the narrative that connects experiences, beliefs, and
other experiential phenomenon? Indeed, many of the experiences one has occur independently of a
self-told narrative, and so it seems that an explanatory narrative of this kind presupposes that there
is a self apart from what kind of story is being told about it.
In order to accommodate for these complaints, proponents of the Anthropological View
have pointed out that self-narratives are not told in isolation, but instead are constantly being
checked against the narratives of others. Therefore, it is not the case that I can add whatever I want
into my self-told story, for blatant falsehoods would meet resistance among the narratives of others.
So, if I decide that I am Luke Skywalker’s long-lost cousin, that part of my self-told narrative will
be rejected by those who know otherwise, such as my parents, siblings, and anyone else privy to
my family history. Now I could reject their counter narratives, and insist that I was indeed Luke
Skywalker’s long-lost cousin. But that would create tension in the web of narratives that are being
told about me, which includes my own, which decreases coherence in the overall understanding of
my life. At some point or another, this tension will have a negative impact on my life, be it my
mental health or my relationships with those who tell the counter narratives.
Interestingly, what this ultimately shows is that it is not just my narrative that constitutes
my self identity, but also the narratives about me put forth by others. This intuitively makes sense,
as people form their identities largely in response to the social relationships around them
throughout their life. As children and adolescents, people are constantly accepting and rejecting
aspects of the narratives of others. Even as fully developed adults, this process continues, because
narratives are by their nature not stagnant. Therefore, being a person, an agent, is having “...a
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relationship with others, and one cannot be fully an agent without being recognized as such”
(Schechtman 2014 p. 71). This aspect of the Anthropological View strongly correlates with
Dennett’s social conditions of personhood, which are conditions three, four, and five. For, as per
Dennett’s third condition, in order to be a person, one must be, in some sense, “created” by others
who baptize them with that title, and treat them in a personalizing way. As the Anthropological
View contends, this personalization consists of narrative creation, in which a comprehensible story
is told about them as an agent rather than as an object. Additionally, as per Dennett’s fourth
condition, a person must also reciprocate this agent narrative back upon the teller, such that a
dialectic is formed, held together by Dennett’s fifth condition, Gricean verbal communication. It is
in this way, through the social conditions of personhood, that every person “...becomes that which
he is addressed by others” (Berger p. 16).
Of the three major views presented, the Anthropological View is the only one that neatly
incorporates all six of Dennett’s necessary conditions of personhood. This is because it is the only
one that allows room for the subjectivity necessary for the conditions that require interaction
between agents, namely conditions three, four, five, and six10. It is this feature of the
Anthropological View that makes it the best, the only, candidate for understanding how a
Dennettian person truly operates. Thus, through the Anthropological View, we can introduce a
seventh condition of personhood, which unifies the previous six under an umbrella of meaningful
context. That condition is that personhoods are shaped by identity-constitutive narratives.

10

As Condition six requires second-order volitions, it consists of a person interacting with herself rather than others,
but this interaction is still a subjective one.
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Part III: World Builders
As explained before, a self-concept is not stagnant, and is not created in isolation from
others. Rather, both the agent in question and the agents with whom she interacts are co-creators of
the personhood, as they posit, accept, and reject one another’s narrative explanations. Because the
narrative explanations are subject to change depending on the circumstance of each interaction,
examining the specific content of the narratives may not be useful in trying to understand selfconcepts. Instead, uncovering the structure of the interactions between agents that build selfconcepts should shed more light on what self-concepts are and how they function.
Now, what is certain about these agent relationships is that they are dialectic in nature. The
personhood of one is being built by interactions with the other, and the other’s personhood is
likewise being built in the same way. These dialectic interactions do not occur in a vacuum. They
occur within the broader context of a society, which provides the meaningful content of each
interaction. Take the student/teacher interaction as an example. Person A may define herself as
the teacher, and person B may define herself as the student. These self-ascribed attributes will
determine the nature of the interaction between the two, as these roles carry certain traditions and
codes of behavior with them. But neither person A nor person B invented the roles of teacher and
student, and neither person invented the particular traditions and codes of behavior that go with
them. Those roles, and the particulars of their manifestations, are set and maintained by other
persons who collectively make up a larger society. Therefore, it is the ongoing conversation
between a person and others that not only sets up the parameters of interaction, but also supplies
those interactions with form and content. This being the case, one cannot separate the study of
persons from the study of their society, which not only existed before them, but continues to exist
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after they die.
In fact, trying to understand personhood apart from society would be akin to studying a tree
outside of the forest ecosystem that shaped it, for:
...it is within society, and as a result of social processes, that the individual becomes
a person, that he attains and holds onto an identity, and that he carries out the
various projects that constitute his life. Man cannot exist apart from society.
(Berger p. 3)
Interestingly, society itself is a creation of persons, past and present. In this way, societal
interaction is also dialectic, as a person constructs his self-concept through the society of which he
is a contributing member. So the final picture that emerges is one of a person that constructs a selfconcept according to the societally structured narratives that others are telling him, but also that
constructs society according to his own personal narrative.
This dialectic is made up of three simultaneous processes, described by Berger as
externalization, objectivation, and internalization.11 Because a self-concept is constructed in this
dialectic, it is important to have an understanding of what these processes look like.
Externalization is the process by which man builds culture. According to Berger, this cultural
construction occurs as a “direct consequence of man’s biological constitution” (Berger p. 5). Other
animals are born with specialized ways of interacting with the world, and these interactions are
usually finely tuned to allow the animal survival in its particular niche environment. Furthermore,
in most cases, animals are born nearly fully formed and capable of interacting with it. But people
are not. People are born without any particular characteristic that is finely tuned for survival in
their niche world, and are not born fully formed. After birth, it is another fifteen to twenty-six

11

For a more robust account of these three processes, see Berger chapter 1.
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years (depending on culture) before a human being is said to be mature, both physically and
psychologically. Because human beings are not suited for any one particular environment, they
must act to create an environment that is suitable for them. This environment needs structure and
order so that human beings may understand it, predict it, and thrive in it.12 The structure and order
imposed on the environment, thus become the culture, which “consists of the totality of man’s
products”, such as language, tools, and institutions (Berger p. 6).
Another facet of the dialectic process is objectivation. This is a direct result of man’s
externalized cultural products, for once they are produced out into the world, they stand apart from
their creators. Every type of cultural product, be it art, music, language, or a tool, becomes a
separate entity once it is projected out into the larger society. It can be seen, studied, and
experienced by others, even if they exist in a different space and time from the creator. For
example, the Greek word ἀγάπη (agape) refers to a type of love that is universal and unconditional.
Though this word is of ancient origin, in lands very different from this one, and by persons who we
will never know, we still have access to this word, as it exists apart from those who created it.
Thus, we may say that “...society is a product of human activity that has attained the status of
objective reality” (Berger p. 11). In this way, cultural concepts like “nationality”, “Existentialism”,
or “debt” exist in the world in the same way that rocks and trees do; their existence stands apart
from my own.
The final aspect of the dialectic process is internalization, and refers to the impact that
objectivations have upon the persons who encounter them. For Berger, this is “... the reabsorption
into consciousness of the objectivated world in such a way that the structures of this world come to
determine the subjective structures of consciousness itself” (Berger p. 15). This means that
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By contrast, it is worth noting that animals are typically born either fully formed, or nearly so, and are readily
adapted to the environment in which they find themselves.

30

objectivated cultural objects do not merely influence persons, they shape how persons experience
reality itself. This is done through the process of socialization, wherein each new generation of
persons is not only taught how to live in the particular society, but also how to experience it. For
example, if motherhood is a dominant value of a tribal village society, then girls in that society will
not only learn how to be mothers but will also develop their self-concepts in terms of motherhood.
Their self-esteem and sense of purpose could be attached to how many children they are able to
produce. The art and music that they make could be representations of aspects of motherhood.
The most important relationships could be the ones between mothers and offspring. Therefore,
when asked the question “who are you?” (in the essence sense, not the past history sense), a girl in
such a society might respond with “I am the daughter of so-and-so”, or “I am the mother of so-andso”, as this particular attribute defines much of her life. By defining herself in terms of
motherhood, the girl effectively allows it then shape what her externalizations will look like, which
are then objectivated, and the process continues ad infinitum.
In this way, we can see that the defining attributes of a self-concept, the ones that an
individual may take as their own, are not randomly selected. They are grounded in the dialectic
cycle of externalization, objectivation, and internalization, which one uses to participate in society.
It would not make sense for the girl mentioned above, who lives in a tribal matriarchal society, to
construct her self-concept around a notion that was foreign to her society, for instance, that of a
professor. This is not to say that all girls in this village will come to have identical self-concepts,
all centered around motherhood. Societies are never wholly centered around one and only one
institution. All that can be said is that, because motherhood is emphasized and valued in this
society, the people who live in it will be confronted with it through interactions with objectivated
institutions and other persons who have internalized it, such that they cannot escape its imposing
presence in their lives. Thus, when a person finds themselves questioning their self-concept, it will
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always be in some way in relation to the institutions that make up their society.
Another reason why self-concepts in this village, or in any society, will always have variety
is due to Dennett’s sixth condition of personhood. The capacity to have second-order volitions
means that a person has the ability to reflexively self-evaluate. So while the institution of
motherhood might be the subject of her first-order volitions, she is always capable of evaluating
those volitions, and changing them as she sees fit. For example, perhaps the girl in question desires
to be a mother, because she wants to make her mother happy, wants her village to respect her, and
other reasons. However, this desire may come under scrutiny if, say, she must marry a man she
does not love in order to become a mother. She may then desire to have different desires. She may
want to desire a different role, one that would not obligate her to marry this unsavory man.
Perhaps this different role is that of a priestess, and she ends up choosing celibacy over motherhood
in order to become one. Either way, whether she chooses to appropriate the role of mother or to
reject it, the institution of motherhood has profoundly shaped her life.
Though persons have the ability to self-reflect on their volitions, and reject the objectivated
social reality, this will not always occur without consequence. For, as Berger says, “The final test
of its objective reality is its capacity to impose itself upon the reluctance of individuals” (Berger p.
11). While the girl may reject motherhood as her society has defined it, the objectivated
institutions may seek to bring her back into line. This could happen in a variety of ways. Perhaps
she is ostracized by her community. Perhaps she is fined, or forced to marry anyway. In our
society, the main institution by which this happens is our legal one.
And so what is the final picture of personhood that has emerged, and does our legal system
recognize it as such? If Dennett’s six conditions are correct, and there are few reasons to doubt
them, and the Anthropological View explains how they work in the context of narrative-making,
then we have a much clearer picture of what a person is. This picture does not consist of a human
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being’s psychological consistency over time or biological constitution, but rather of agents in
active construction of themselves and others, through a dialectic about what society ought to look
like. From this perspective, it is possible to evaluate whether or not that society, created by
persons, in fact treats them as such. For, as Berger says, it is entirely possible that “Paradoxically,
man then produces a world that denies him” (Berger p. 86).
A proper legal system, therefore, will respect a person's’ right to construct his own narrative
as an agent, as well as to accept and reject the narratives of the society around him. The goal of
any society should be to allow the proper context in which persons develop coherent symmetry
between their own personal narrative, and those of others making up the society around them. Just
societies will encourage symmetry, and unjust ones deny it.
By understanding the legal institution as one that is externalized, objectified, and
internalized, we can see that it is not as fixed as it may appear, for “No set of legal institutions or
prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning” (Cover p. 4).
Therefore, as individuals accept, reject, and create new narratives, the institutions that are
maintained by them will also change. Yet given this, one would think that the legal institutions
would reflect this dialectic nature of its creation. But as it stands, the law that we have now does
not view persons as Dennettian agents and subjective narrative makers, who create and maintain it.
It views them as Lockean time slices, which are objects to be studied in isolation.
This being the case, it is now that we turn to our objectified institution, the law. The
objective in doing so is to see how this understanding of persons as “whats” rather than “whos” has
been applied in certain contexts, and to judge whether or not the result did justice to our
understanding of persons as subjects, co-creators of themselves, others, and the law itself. The law
is itself an enormous category, and thus our discussion of personhood will focus on one particular
aspect of it: property.
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Part IV: Personhood and Property Law
Much of the American political system is based on John Locke’s ideas. In fact, “It would
be difficult to overstate Locke's influence on the American Revolution and the people who created
the government that followed it” (Doernberg p. 57). This includes our understanding of property,
and how property relates to our notions of justice.
Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an
uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally
with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not
only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries
and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in
others. (Locke Ch VII Section 87-89)
But what does it mean to own property? Debates around this issue tend to arise in the
context of property disputes, that is, when two separate parties claim the same object as their own.
Historically, the grounds for deciding who is baptized with the title of “owner” has largely
revolved around the idea of merit, of who “deserves” the title. Locke himself was very concerned
with merit, and his ideas have influenced the way in which we understand property today.
He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he
gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself.
Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask, then, when did they begin to be
his? ( Locke II paragraph 27)
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For Locke, the justification for something being one’s property is based on the labor which
is required to remove it from nature, or rather, what is commonly accessible to all. “The labour
that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in
them”, he says (II paragraph 27). Thus, it may be said that person Q is justified in owning property
X because task Y was done by Q.
However, Locke foresaw, to some extent, the problems that might arise given that mere
labor was the justification for ownership, and thus mentions two constraints. He understood that it
would seem wrong for an individual to accrue large masses of property while others had none.
How much property becomes too much property? “As much as anyone can make use of to any
advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in. Whatever is
beyond this is more than his share, and belongs to others”, he writes (II paragraph 30). Therefore,
according to Locke, man should not take so much property that he cannot use all of it before it rots
and wastes away. This can be understood as the spoilage constraint. The second constraint regards
the right to subsist, which he takes natural to all human beings, whether property owning or not.
For Locke no piece of property caused “…any prejudice to any other man, since there was still
enough and as good left, and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was
nevertheless left for others because of his enclosure for himself” (II paragraph 32.). Therefore,
according to Locke, man is free to take any property so long as other men have enough resources
left for them to subsist on, which will be called the subsistence restraint.
Given these constraints, one would think that Locke was quite worried about inequality, at
least to some extent. Yet this was not the case. Despite these constraints, Locke believed that
inequality was a justified result of capitalism, solely for the invention of one thing: money.
And thus came in the use of money; some lasting thing that men might keep without
spoiling, and that, by mutual consent, men would take in exchange for the truly
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useful but perishable supports of life…And as different degrees of industry were apt
to give men possessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave
them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them (II paragraphs 47 and 48).
Money allowed a way for there to be inequality and yet not violate either of Locke’s
constraints, for money neither spoils nor does the ownership of it deprive anyone else of
subsistence. Furthermore, money allowed every individual a way to justly accrue property
according to their corresponding “degrees of industry”. Therefore, the more one worked, the more
money they accumulated. The rich man was rich because he worked hard, and the poor man was
poor because he was lazy.

Problems with Locke’s Account
While there have been other complaints against Locke, the following is concerned with two
ways in which Locke’s justification for inequality fail. First, Locke fails to recognize the twodimensional nature of property, and thus is looking at the nature of equality with one eye shut.
Second, Locke’s justification for which task should be compensated by which property fails to take
persons as agents into account, instead only viewing persons as objects within an impersonal
economic system.

I. Two-dimensional Property
While certainly appealing to common sense, Locke’s view is overly simplistic, and
therefore problematic. Locke’s initial treatise was concerned with physical resource ownership,
such as land and agricultural products, which makes perfect sense given the agrarian worries of his
day. For him, the worry was more about wasting perfectly good resources than about the harm
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done to other people due to property inequalities, and this is because Locke’s view of property is
one-dimensional.
Fungible property seems relatively easy to trace back to some work, if the goal is to find a
justification for the ownership of it, and as long as the property remains small. Yet as the scope of
the property takes on larger and larger dimensions, Locke’s system starts to crack.

Take a

monopoly, for example, specifically one that produces cars. This hypothetical monopoly owns
most of the steps in the line of production, from raw resources to the end product, as well as patents
on all the cars it makes, which are all that are available to be bought. Perhaps this company is
well-run. Perhaps it distributes its resources and produces cars without wasting anything.
Furthermore, everyone within the community in which these cars are sold has all the subsistence
they need. Though one may be inclined to state that monopolies are unjust institutions, Locke could
not, for there is both work and the proper use of resources involved, satisfying his two
requirements for just ownership. So what has Locke missed?
Locke’s assumption is that property only has a fungible dimension, but that is clearly not
true. As Margaret Radin points out in her paper Property and Personhood, property lies along a
spectrum. At one end are things considered purely fungible, such as raw currency. On the other
end are things constitutive of one’s personhood. This end is highly subjective, in that any
particular thing could have great importance to one’s personhood. A scribbled crayon drawing
may be considered worthless to a passerby, yet may constitute a great part of oneself if, say, that
drawing were given to a father by his daughter. The drawing may come to represent fatherhood,
which constitutes a significant part of the man’s life, such that the loss of it would cause harm to
that individual’s sense of himself. Both raw currency and a drawing could be claimed as property
by an individual, though it seems that the two claims are made on different grounds.
As Radin herself states, separating property into two categories is not always useful, as it is
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possible for the same object to be both fungible and personhood-constitutive. A diamond wedding
ring, for example, has both qualities. But it seems to be the case that in situations where there is a
conflict between the two, individuals will favor the personhood-constitutive value over the fungible
value. One would be hard pressed to find an individual willing to sell her wedding ring back to the
jewelry store for its asking price, if she still loved her husband and found meaning in her role as his
wife. Radin takes note of this:
It then might hold that those rights near one end of the continuum – fungible
property rights -- can be overridden in some cases in which those near the otherpersonal property rights -- cannot be. This is to argue not that fungible property
rights are unrelated to personhood, but simply that distinctions are sometimes
warranted depending upon the character or strength of the connection. Thus, the
personhood perspective generates a hierarchy of entitlements: The more closely
connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement. (Radin p 986)
Yet one may then ask how fungible property could impinge upon the personhood of others.
When discussing properties of a common variety, like a house, a hunting license, a bookstore, or a
wedding ring, it would seem ridiculous to claim that ownership of such somehow impedes on the
personhood of others. Yet as the ownership base of one individual is increased, so is the likelihood
that the personhood of another is affected by it. This is because the person-building activity
between woman and her world is not a private or a one-way street. Though an action, say creating
a sculpture out of clay, certainly ties the identity of the agent to it, that of “sculptor”, the object
then informs the agent as well as everyone else as to the identity, the personhood, of the person
who made it, as well as themselves. Spectators can perceive not only that someone else is the
“artist” of a given piece, but also that they are not. It is through such a process that people form
their identities, their personhoods, in part from what is projected onto the world by others in
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addition to what they themselves project.
Just such a process is well-described in sociologist Peter L. Berger’s “The Sacred Canopy”.
The two-way street is composed of woman in her world-shaping activity, named objectivation, and
the objectified objects then informing individuals how to structure their own subjective lives,
named internalization.13 As one man goes about cordoning off certain pieces of property marked
as “mine” with leases, contracts, and certifications, that property continues to engage in a dialogue
with all who come into contact with it, informing them of their status as non-owners. Thus, this is
where the issue of personhood comes into the arena.
Purely fungible property, money, does not sit idly. It is put to use in purchasing vehicles,
apartments, businesses, clothing and toys. Especially in terms of real estate and businesses, money
certainly allows one to buy more things than could ever be effectively utilized on one’s own. Thus,
it is possible for one individual to own dozens of businesses and have thousands of people working
under him without either the waste of resources or the deprivation of subsistence of others. Yet
this account fails entirely to take personhood into account, and breaks down under analysis of
situations in which a conflict occurs between what is considered fungible and what is considered
personhood-constitutive. Under the stress of this kind of conflict, both Locke’s spoilage constraint
and his subsistence constraint do not ensure a just system. Radin discusses residential tenancy as a
prime example. On the one hand the landlord may see an apartment building as something only
fungible, to be bought or sold, and only as such. Yet for the tenant, it is a home, within which
one’s identity is undeniably bound. According to Radin, this way of thinking “is one basis for the
revolution in tenants' rights. Courts began to view the rights in question as more closely related to
the personhood of the tenant than to that of the landlord, and accordingly moved to protect the

According to Berger, the cycle of objectivation and internalization is the key step in socializing a
person into a society.
13

39

leasehold as the tenant's home” (Radin p 993). Therefore, tenants have a property claim over
where they live, and this claim often trumps the fungible one made by the landlord, as in cases of
sudden eviction without notice.
While the case may be clear that personhood-constitutive property claims are often higher
up in the hierarchy of entitlements than fungible property claims, it is not clear whether property
inequality in general does harm to personhoods. Though the idea of property as an expression of
personhood is still relatively new, and therefore lacks precedent in law, evidence of its importance
can be found wherever there is economic inequality.
This can only be demonstrated if property inequality of the fungible kind could be shown
to be detrimental to one’s personhood. Take the introduction of Wal-Mart into small cities and
towns throughout the United States. As has been well-documented, “The overwhelming weight of
the independent research on the impact of Wal-Mart stores on local and national economies –
including jobs, taxes, wages, benefits, manufacturing and existing retail businesses – shows that
Wal-Mart depresses area wages and labor benefits contributing to the current decline of good
middleclass jobs, pushes out more retail jobs than it creates, and results in more retail vacancies”
(Angotti p. 4). Walmart negatively affects the communities it injects itself into in at least two
profound ways. First, it forces nearby local businesses to go out of business.14 Second, it takes
funds out of the communities, thereby damaging the local economy.15 While there is ample
evidence suggesting that the fungible properties of local community members are negatively
impacted by the introduction of large chain stores like Walmart, little has been said of the harm
done in terms of personhood property damage. To a local business owner, their store could have

See Angotti page 5. In Chicago, one Walmart forced 82 local businesses to close with two years
of opening.
15
See Angotti page 5. Of every $100 spent at chain stores like Walmart, only $43 remains in the
local economy, compared to $68 spent in locally owned stores.
14
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been open for decades or passed down from parents, and thus takes a significant role in shaping
their identity within the community. Even if the ex-storeowner is given a job of equal wage at the
local Wal-Mart which ran him out of business in the first place, would that be considered an equal
trade? Under a welfare rights theory of distribution, the answer is a definite NO.
If a welfare rights theory of distribution makes personhood interests take precedence
over some claims to wealth, permitting taxation to provide largess for the poor, it
may equally permit curtailing fungible property rights that impinge on the poor,
unless doing so only for the holders of certain assets would under the circumstances
violate accepted norms of equality. (Radin p. 991)
Thus, even if Wal-Mart cannot be shown to have wasted resources or kept local people
from their right to subsist, the gross damage done to the personhood property of thousands of
people would be more than enough to demonstrate the injustice of inequality created by the owners
of Walmart. This is because the coherence of the narratives that local people have created, both for
themselves and each other, would be shattered by the emergence of an amorphous, impersonal
entity that gobbles up aspects of their naturally formed personal identities, and gives cookie cutter
shaped ones as compensation. As non-fungible compensation, the community is offered only a
position, a role, in the alien institution that has crushed all others. The residents are forced to either
join the world of Wal-mart, which they did not have a hand in shaping, or to be expelled from the
economic life of the community for good, through abject poverty.
What is obvious here is that the opportunity for a just society, one that encourages
symmetry between a person’s self-told narrative and the narratives about her told by her
community, has been lost. Though many aspects of coherence will likely maintain their potency,
such as familial relationships and religious convictions, others have been irrevocably damaged,
namely those associated with vocation. This happens because of the intrusion of an outside, alien
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institution, which the members of the society did not co-construct. So they had no hand in shaping
its meanings, but are having their own meanings dictated to them by force. Such a relationship is
not a dialectic, and therefore no symmetry between narratives could possibly be created. Rather,
the meanings being projected by the alien institution must simply be accepted, without question, or
negative consequences will be faced.
Take the coherence that would exist between, say, a local guild of furniture makers in
which each member creates and confirms this part of their identity through one another. Each
member of the guild has a role within society, whose value and legitimacy are reinforced
throughout the larger community acceptance of them. But with the arrival of easy access to cheap,
easily assembled furniture comes a lessening of their value. If everyone in a community is buying
the same kind of furniture from the same faceless company, the value of a furniture maker as a
person-role will diminish. Members of the community cannot put on the role of furniture maker if
the other members of their society do not recognize them as such. A person could still declare
herself a furniture maker, but to a society that does not value that role, it would be the same as if
she declared herself a shaman in a modern, Westernized city. For, if their furniture is no longer
wanted, no longer purchased, and no longer displayed in the various places around the community,
this aspect of their self-told story will no longer be coherent among the other narratives. Instead,
this person would lose his vocation, that of furniture-maker, and be forced to pick a new one from
among the cookie-cutter options available: cashier, stocker, greeter, transporter, etc.
What should be noted among these new roles, as invented and valued by Wal-mart, is that
they are roles that fit an object, not an agent. There is nothing creative about being a cashier, a
stocker, a greeter, or a transporter. The thing taking these roles is a piece in a chain of
manufacturing, not a subjective, unique, meaning-maker. Within the world of Wal-mart, all
aspects of vocation are being dictated down upon the individual, and there is no room for the
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individual to respond, to contribute to the overall culture of the institution which she is a part. In
sum, a coherent life in which vocation carries significance would experience serious challenges in
this context.

II. Which Y justifies which X?
As was stated before, Locke’s theory of justification heavily relies on the idea of merit, that
person Q is justified in owning property X because task Y was done by Q. However, no account is
given by him as to how to determine which property is a suitable reward for which task. Getting
paid $20 an hour to help someone move seems like a fair deal. Yet getting $1 an hour would cause
an outrage. Why is this so? Many would simply chalk this up to market forces. The wage is
determined by whoever is willing to do the job for the least amount of money. However, “market
forces” are often cited as reasons why a CEO pays himself $100,000 to sit in on a meeting for an
hour, McDonalds employees make an unlivable wage despite working more than 40 hours a week,
and other compensation scenarios that are problematic.
It could be argued that utilitarianism sought to remedy this problem. As John Stuart Mill
pointed out, all men have a general sense of what is just and what is not.
It is universally considered just that each person should obtain that (whether good or
evil) which he deserves; and unjust that he should obtain a good, or be made to
undergo an evil, which he does not deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest and most
emphatic form in which the idea of justice is conceived by the general mind”
(Utilitarianism, Ch. 5, paragraph 7)
Thus, the concept of desert is introduced.
Despite this common sense approach to desert, there fails to be any substantial account by Mill or
any other utilitarian philosopher for determining what is just compensation in any given situation. Sidgwick
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sums up the utilitarian take on just desert by associating it with expediency. “…when a man is said to

deserve reward for any services to society, the meaning is that it is expedient to reward him, in
order that he and others may be induced to render similar services by the expectation of similar
rewards”, he writes (1907, 284). Thus, a person’s salary can be seen as a just desert, in that it is
expedient for society to encourage others to do the same type of work. This is why a computer
programmer would earn $80,000 a year, and a Wal-Mart greeter would make $8 an hour. A
programmer provides more value to society, and therefore it is advantageous to pay her more, in
order to encourage others to provide the same service. Yet coming up with examples in which a
desert is not expedient is relatively easy.
According to this take on desert, it may be expedient to encourage one kind of economic
activity over another, regardless of whether or not the agent performing the action truly deserves it.
For instance, perhaps a city is in need of street sweepers, and there is only one man doing this task.
This man does this task lazily, and only works two days a week. In order to encourage others to do
it, the city decides to pay this man a full salary with benefits. There is certainly expediency in
doing so, but would anyone consider this just compensation for the work he performs?
Furthermore, a utilitarian approach does not provide a solid justification for the accruing of
all types of property. Take inheritance for example. What is the overall social good when a man
inherits ten million dollars from his parents? What does his inheritance encourage others to do?
Be born into rich families? On utilitarianism, there is no expedient basis that can serve as a
justification for inherited property, regardless of how large or small it is. Yet to many, an
inheritance does not seem like an unjust way to gain property, be it large or small. In fact, it is
often taken to be a matter of personal identity, rather than of merit. One feels entitled to the
inheritance of some object or funds because of who one is in relation to others, not because one
feels that they earned it through just desert.
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While in many ways utilitarianism was a critique on Locke’s natural rights, the fact that it
was not able to improve on Locke’s theory of desert base highlights the problematic nature of both
of these theories. It suggests that there is indeed a great misconception underlying how both
accounts think about property in general. And what these accounts are failing to address is the
seventh condition of personhood.

III. Justice for Persons and their Property
On an Anthropological View of persons, perhaps except for money, property can never be
purely fungible, because it will always be owned by persons, who are active agents. Thus, any
theory of property that fails to account for persons as subjective meaning-makers will have
problems in its application. The formula, person Q is justified in owning property X because task Y
was done by Q, will therefore never fully explain our worries about property, in that it takes
persons to be objects, rather than agents, and assumes a purely fungible nature of property. It is
only through understanding property as an extension of someone’s personhood story that the
creation and execution of property laws can become more just. For, in many cases, it is the
disruption of coherent narratives that is the real damage being done. Simplifying the complexity of
the case into a dollar amount only ignores the real matter at hand, and supplies no real peace to
those who feel their property, and by extension their personhood, has been violated.
Therefore, one way to make the creation and execution of property law more just would be
to revise each in terms of property’s two-dimensional nature rather than in terms of a purely
fungible dimension. In order to see how this might work, let’s examine the common practice of
eminent domain, through which the government allows itself to seize the property of individuals,
should it decide that the property is needed to serve the public good. Now this practice stems from
the Fifth Amendment, which states that “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
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without just compensation”. The key term here is, of course, “just compensation”, as those who
wrote the amendment likely feared that the government would become abusive, and seize whatever
it wanted, whenever it wanted. By forcing it to compensate whatever it takes, the authors of the
constitution created a consequence as check against that power. But what is just compensation?
Historically speaking, in most cases just compensation is determined by fair market value,
or rather, whatever an economic expert determines most people would pay for the property. So if
the government wishes to take my house in order to build a highway, they must pay me whatever a
real estate expert says my house is worth on the market, and I cannot refuse this offer. On this
understanding, I would have to accept a monetary sum, say $500,000, if that is what the market
forces say it is worth.
On the face of it, this would seem fair, and certainly a step up from government property
seizures without any compensation, as has happened in the past. Yet it must be noted that the only
compensation given is purely fungible, and completely ignores the other aspect of ownership. For
what if my house had been in my family for generations, such that my role as its safe-keeper were
dominant in my construction of my personhood? Surely, even “just compensation” on the liberal
side of market value cost would not suffice. Like a wedding ring, the house has person-constitutive
value that could not be replaced by fungible means. So what then?
If it is the case that there is a personhood-constitutive element in the property, the first step
would be to determine to what degree. The problem with doing so is that this is highly subjective.
What means the world to one person may mean nothing to another. However, there is one criterion
that may help the law determine an objective measure of a subjective experience. Whatever the
property may be, its importance in a person’s identity will be greater the more it serves as a
foundation for coherence in the person’s person-narrative, and the greater this importance, the
greater the compensation will need to be. As stated before, coherence is the symmetry that a man
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may build between his own self-told narrative and those of his fellow persons within his society.
Naturally, not all properties will have the same strength in building this symmetry, and, more
importantly, other people may be brought in to testify to the importance of this particular property
in the man’s person-building activity. For, if it is true that our personhoods are constructed by
others as much as we ourselves, on the Anthropological View the narratives of others are just as
important.
In this way, abuse of the system can be avoided. It would be easy for a man, with such a
subjectively-oriented law, to abuse the system, saying that a house was a family heirloom when in
fact it meant nothing to him, in the hopes of getting more fungible compensation than just the
market value. For example, perhaps a man is making a claim that the house he is currently living
in has been in his home for generations, and that he feels it his purpose to continue the tradition of
maintaining his family line on the property. It is part of his being, he says, it is part of his identity
that he is a sort of guardian of the family heritage. On the Anthropological View, this attitude can
exist in isolation, but it serves little strength in maintaining narrative cohesion unless there is a
network of persons who corroborate this view, and address him as such. The onus of proving that
his personhood was attached to the property would then be on the man, such that he would have to
provide a network of others to give testimony on his behalf. Without it, there is little proof of
symmetry, and his claim might be viewed as dubious.
Additionally, even if there is proof of symmetry between his view of himself and others, it
must be demonstrated that the symmetry is strongly identity-constitutive. Just because a man
claims that his identity rests on the ownership and maintenance of a property, doesn’t mean that it
is always true. Even if others can corroborate, how could one know the strength of this attribute in
shaping his personhood? How can one tell if a property is weakly identity-constitutive versus
strongly constitutive? The answer should lie in other aspects of this person’s life. If being the
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protector of family history is indeed one of the key attributes that shape this person’s life, there
should be evidence of this attribute in many places. If this attribute is strongly identityconstitutive, his other possessions, for example, should reflect this. It should not be the case that
the house or the land is the only thing he owns that represents his family’s history. If he truly
understood himself as the protector of his family history, his other possessions would likely be
heirlooms, photo albums, historical records, and other memory preservations from his family’s
past. Likewise, his actions would also likely reflect this aspect of his personhood, as he would
probably take great care of this property by never letting it fall into disrepair. All of these factors
could be brought to bear as evidence in court, or likewise argued against, should there be suspicion
of lying.
It would be ineffective for additional fungible property to be offered up as compensation in
cases where there is damage to one’s personhood. In many cases, there may be no clear monetary
amount that will suite the person whose property is being taken. In these cases, the focus of just
compensation should avoid negotiation in terms of purely fungible property, for money is not the
issue here. Instead, just compensation should focus on which attribute the person is assigning
identity importance to, and understand how the damage being done to this attribute can be
remedied. For example, if the person in question takes himself to be a protector of family history,
and that history is tied to the property being claimed under eminent domain, this would be the
identity-constitutive attribute to focus on. Taking the property would damage this attribute, so just
compensation would have to cater to repairing its constitution. Rather than prescribe a repair,
which is an order, a negotiation between the government and the property holder would occur, to
ensure a dialectic process that involves the person in question. As the person constitutes himself as
a protector of family history, it must be asked what other ways he can serve in this respect, without
the property, or with only some of it. It may be that the government should take other measures to
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ensure his identity is repaired, such as allowing him access to the property, not bulldozing
everything on the property, paying for the relocation of buildings on the property, or any other
number of myriad remedies.
The main point here is that the focus should not be on how much money a person would
need to accept violence done against their personhood, but rather on acknowledging his
personhood, and working to ensure the preservation of its coherence. For it must be remembered
that person-constitutive narratives are not formed in isolation. They are born among a web of
others, and doing disservice to one often means harming many of those connected to it. Though
the fungible dimension of property will inevitably be involved at some point, it should not be the
primary way that justice is understood. Doing so ignores the special dimensions of persons as
subjective meaning-making agents, and instead tries to understand them as objects. This method,
essentially cramming square blocks into round holes, will always produce some degree of violence
to the personhoods of those involved in legal disputes, as it seeks to replace narrative coherence
with a dollar amount. Only by refining our legal definition of persons to reflect their true nature,
and enforcing the law with respect to its structures will a more just society emerge.
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